A wealth of research from multiple disciplines shows that contrary to the usual assumption of fixed, well-defined and context independent preferences, individuals are likely to approach a choice task through a process of preference construction, in other words, using rules and heuristics that are dependent on the choice environment. More specifically, heuristics that are defined by the local choice context, such as the gains or losses of an attribute value relative to the other attributes, seem to matter significantly. Recent empirical findings also demonstrate that previous choices made by respondents and previous choice tasks shown to respondents can affect the current choice outcome, indicating a form of inter-dependence across choice sets.
Introduction
The typical approach used in much of the discrete choice modelling literature assumes that well-defined preferences exist for most decision tasks. Under the standard random utility theory, preferences are stable and invariant to choice tasks and are fully known to the respondent. In the great majority of cases, the analyst writes out a utility function assuming that the respondent is cognitively indefatigable, examining all alternatives and all attributes across all choice tasks in the same fully compensatory manner. The linear weighted additive form for utility, estimated by means of the multinomial logit model, has been found to be a convenient representation which is capable of embodying all these assumptions and has therefore become the mainstay in discrete choice modelling.
As a description of how people behave, work in the decision behaviour field, and more recently from the choice experiment literature, has cast considerable doubt that the weighted additive function, assumed independent of contextual effects, comes close to being an adequate representation of the actual processes used in the majority of decision tasks. Empirical research from the psychology literature has shown that preferences for an alternative are influenced by the choice context itself, in other words, by factors that are beyond the immediate attributes of the alternative under consideration. Choice task characteristics such as the number of alternatives and attributes impact decisions in terms of how decision rules are selected and applied (Payne et al., 1993) . Decisions may also be made according to some reference point selected by the respondent. This reference may have something to do with the other alternatives in the same choice set or even across previously encountered choice sets (Simonson and Tversky, 1992; Kivetz et al., 2004) . Moreover, different respondents may be attending to various subsets of attributes, and such heterogeneity may be masked if it is assumed that preference weights are the same across the entire dataset. What these findings suggest is that compared to the context independent, linear weighted additive form of utility, which has no doubt been a very useful analytical tool, other representations of utility which better approximate the realism of real-life decision making can lead to better goodness of fit and more plausible model estimates and outputs.
In line with this broad thrust, the purpose of this paper is to review some of the important findings about decision processes and the theoretical models that have emerged from the literature, before testing a subset of these heuristics in an empirical stated choice context, using a non-linear logit form in a functional specification and in a setting which allows multiple heuristics to be weighted. The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews some of the heuristics that have been identified the transport, marketing, environmental and psychology literatures. Section 3 describes the dataset which will be used for the empirical analysis of multiple heuristics, detailed in Section 4. The final section concludes with suggestions for further research.
Heuristics in Choice Modelling
The psychology literature has amassed a wealth of evidence to suggest that humans rely on the use of quick mental processing rules known as decision heuristics to manage the vast number of decisions that must be made in everyday life. Notwithstanding the simplicity of the weighted additive rule for the purposes of modelling, it is recognised that this rule, if followed strictly to the letter, is cognitively demanding and time consuming (Payne et al., 3 1993) . Heuristics are therefore needed to balance the trade off between making accurate decisions (as summarised by the weighted additive rule) and minimising cognitive effort. Early work in this field frequently discussed heuristics such as lexicography (Tversky, 1969) , elimination-by-aspects (Tversky, 1972) and the majority of confirming dimensions (Russo and Dosher, 1983) 1 . Some authors like Bettman et al. (1998) have attempted to make sense of how people use these heuristics by relating them to choice task characteristics (number of alternatives, number of attributes, inter-attribute correlation etc.) in a "choice goals framework".
Over the years, the discrete choice literature has made a number of advances in terms of modelling selected aspects of these "classic" decision rules. Reminiscent of the eliminationby-aspects heuristic, some authors have modelled decisions as following a two stage process, with the first stage typically involving a screening rule to narrow a universal set of alternatives into a consideration set before choice is made in the second stage (Cantillo and Ortuzar, 2005; Swait 2009 ). The elimination-by-aspects heuristic may also be directly modelled by obtaining information from respondents on their attribute cut-off levels (Swait, 2001) , or by testing various implicit rules in a latent class structure (Hess et al., 2011) . Lexicographic choice was studied by Saelesminde (2006) and also modelled by Hess et al. (2011) , while Hensher and Collins (2011) looked at modelling the majority of confirming dimensions.
Another broad category of heuristics, which we will primarily focus on in this paper, might be called "relational" heuristics. By "relational", these heuristics emphasise the comparison of ratings of one alternative against another, allowing the value obtained from an alternative to also depend on the local choice context. The random regret minimisation (RRM) model first suggested by Chorus et al. (2008) with subsequent enhancements in Chorus (2010) falls into this category (see also Hess et al. (2011) for a case study using the RRM). In the RRM model, respondents seek to minimise the regret which occurs when the attributes of the considered alternative perform poorly relative to the attributes of the other alternatives in the choice set. Chorus (2010) shows that the RRM model is able to explain the fairly robust empirical findings of the so-called "extremeness aversion effect", which leads respondents to prefer an in-between alternative when extreme alternatives are available in the choice set. Extreme alternatives are those which perform best on some attributes, but worst on others. Loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) has been offered as one explanation for extremeness aversion. Because the disadvantages of an alternative (defined relative to the other alternatives in the choice set) loom larger than its advantages, the in-between alternative is favoured with its smaller advantages and disadvantages, compared to the larger advantages and disadvantages involved in choosing the extreme alternatives (Tversky and Simonson, 1993) . More recently, Louviere and Myer (2008) argue that this effect can also arise from preference uncertainty among risk averse individuals.
Among the models of extremeness aversion proposed in the marketing literature by Kivetz et al. (2004) , we will consider their context concavity model, which takes the attribute value with the lowest part-utility as the reference point and codes the utility of other attribute values as gains against the reference. The specification for the modelled component of utility is shown in Equation (2.1).
Under prospect theory, as gains are assumed to be concave relative to the reference, c k is introduced as a concavity parameter for attribute k. X rk in this case is the attribute value that gives the lowest utility on attribute k across all alternatives in the local choice set. Using some assumed values for the part-utilities, Table 2 .1 illustrates how the contextual concavity model leads to an increased relative preference for the intermediate alternative (Alt 2). As a consequence of concavity, which implies diminishing marginal sensitivity to gains, the inbetween alternative with its moderate gains on the attributes provides a higher utility level, compared to the extreme alternatives. On the other hand, in a linear specification for the utility function, all three alternatives yield the same value for V j . 
Moreover, extremeness aversion may be further distinguished by the compromise effect and the polarisation effect (Simonson and Tversky, 1992; Tversky and Simonson, 1993) . The compromise effect is a symmetric form of extremeness aversion, occurring when disadvantages loom larger than advantages on all attributes. The in-between alternative becomes the compromise, and its share is enhanced relative to both extreme alternatives, as in the worked example of Table 2.1. Polarisation occurs when the introduction of an inbetween alternative substantially reduces the relative share of one of the extreme alternatives but makes the other extreme alternative even more favoured. This happens when disadvantages loom larger than advantages on only some of the attributes of the alternatives, but not on others. Both the compromise and the polarisation effects have been demonstrated in the marketing literature; however, the usual methodology to do this involves a between subjects design to experimentally manipulate the number of alternatives shown to respondents and not the discrete choice modelling approach described later on.
The opposite of extremeness aversion may also be true. Gourville and Soman (2007) document cases of extremeness seeking when choice sets are "non-alignable". A nonalignable choice set entails alternatives "that vary along discrete, non-compensatory attributes, such that one alternative may possess one set of desirable features, while a second alternative may possess a different set of desirable features" (Gourville and Soman, 2007, p. 10 ). An example of a non-alignable choice set is the choice among multiple car models, with say one alternative having a high quality car stereo with rear seat DVD entertainment 5 (but no sun roof), and another alternative having the sun roof, but no rear seat entertainment. Hence, the trade-off across attributes is discrete, such that by choosing one alternative, the desirable features of another have to be given up completely. In cases of non-alignable choices, Gourville and Soman found that respondents displayed an increased tendency to either of the extreme alternatives (i.e., a low price, basic model or a high-price, fully loaded model) when the size of the choice set is increased. The heuristic posited to undergird this behaviour is an all-or-nothing strategy, i.e., choosing the basic low-priced alternative or the high-priced, fully loaded alternative, rather than something in between.
Gourville and Soman do not outright reject extremeness aversion, but qualify that extremeness aversion occurs when the attributes are alignable, i.e., when attributes can be traded off incrementally. For example, a choice involving a low-priced, low processing speed computer model and a medium-priced, medium processing speed model is alignable and the introduction of an extreme high priced, high processing speed option causes the relative market share of the intermediate option to go up. Gourville and Soman suggest that more needs to be done to investigate the impact of hybrid alignable/non-alignable attributes in the choice set, which arguably characterises most real-world decision making.
Besides allowing for context dependence in the local choice set to influence choices, the notion of "relational" can be extended to allow preceding choice tasks or choice outcomes to impact current choice. As noted by Simonson and Tversky, "in deciding whether or not to select a particular option, people commonly compare it to other alternatives that are currently available as well as with relevant alternatives that have been encountered in the past" (Simonson and Tversky, 1992, p. 282) . Since most choice experiments require respondents to answer a series of choice tasks, the Simonson and Tversky assertion implies that preferences over attributes are not necessarily independent across choice tasks.
Indeed, we now have a significant amount of evidence that what was shown to respondents in the past matters in the current decision making context (Bateman et al., 2008; Day and Prades, 2010) . Of these ordering effects, strategic misrepresentation is a particular concern in the environmental literature, as is value learning (Scheufele and Bennett, 2010; McNair et al., 2011a; 2011b) . In strategic misrepresentation, respondents are assumed to withhold truthful revelation of their preferences for the current hypothetical alternative and stick with the status quo if a previously chosen hypothetical alternative was better compared to those on offer in the current choice set. This withholding of the truth may be allowed to occur up to a probability. In value learning, respondents choose based on the current attribute levels relative to the past; for example, an alternative is more likely to be chosen if its current price is low compared to levels experienced in previous choice tasks. Related to strategic misrepresentation and value learning is the notion of reference point revision, which DeShazo (2002) argues is used by respondents to frame the desirability of follow-up options relative to some previously chosen alternative. This previously chosen alternative happens to become the new reference point. In a direct test of how reference points are shifted when non status quo alternatives are chosen, Hensher and Collins (2011) found that if a nonreference (i.e., non status quo) alternative is chosen in the preceding choice set 1 s  , the reference in the current choice set s is revised and the utility of the non status quo alternatives increases. This suggests a shift in the value function around the new reference point.
In the remainder of the paper, we proceed to test the following three heuristics in the context of a transport dataset: (i) extremeness aversion; (ii) the majority of confirming dimensions and (iii) reference revision.
Empirical Application
The dataset used in this paper is obtained from a stated choice study undertaken in 2008 on a proposed toll road in Australia. The experimental design consisted of 32 choice situations, with each of the 752 respondents given a block of 16 choice situations. Each choice situation consisted of the current trip as well as two unlabelled hypothetical experimental alternatives, with the levels of each attribute of the hypothetical alternatives pivoted around the level of the corresponding attribute in the current trip. The exception is the toll cost attribute. As most respondents reported not having to pay a toll in their current trip, the levels of the toll cost attribute are fixed over a range from no toll to $4.20, with the upper limit determined by the trip length of the respondent"s reported trip. Figure 3 .1 illustrates the choice task presented to the respondents. The experiment was designed according to the Defficiency criterion, which increases the statistical efficiency of the model for a given sample size, compared to less statistically efficient methods such as orthogonal designs (Rose and Bliemer, 2008) . As this paper is an exploratory analysis into the role of heuristics in choice experiments, we will focus only on the time components of the trip -viz., time in free flow traffic (FF), time slowed down by other traffic (SDT) and time in stop/start/crawling conditions (SST) and the cost components -running costs (RC) and toll costs (TC), in model estimation. Doing so does not mean that we are unaware of the potential for model misspecification in ignoring the attributes associated with the probability of early, on-time and late arrivals. Indeed, there is a growing literature on how respondents handle risk and uncertainty in choice experiments (see for example, and future work in this area may bring these various approaches together. For the modelling purposes at hand, the socioeconomic profile of the data is given in Table 3 .1, while the attributes of the choice tasks are summarised in Table 3 .2. For this dataset, it is also useful to describe the incidence of lexicographic behaviour, as shown in Table 3 .3. In this context, lexicographic behaviour is defined as always choosing, in all 16 choice sets, that alternative possessing the minimum level of a particular attribute, for example, always choosing the alternative with the lowest free flow time. This minimum level may or may not be unique among the three alternatives. We observe that a significant portion of respondents is always choosing the alternative with the lowest toll costs, indicating that these respondents are either highly sensitive to toll costs (but still trading off on the other attributes of the alternative), or that the lexicographic rule, with a high importance weight placed on the toll cost attribute, is being used to make decisions. Intuitively, this would not be surprising considering that 740 out of 752 respondents reported not having to pay a toll for their current trip.
Empirical Analysis

Referencing Relative to the Worst Attribute Level in Choice Set
We first derive empirical estimates for the multinomial logit (MNL) model, with the modelled component of utility specified to be linear in the parameters and linear in the attributes (LPLA). Parameter estimates are generic across alternatives. Included in the estimation is a socioeconomic variable for the respondent"s age and an interaction term for income and cost, where cost is defined to be the sum of RC and TC. Results are shown in Table 4 .1. Relaxing the LPLA assumption, the first heuristic we test arises from one of Kivetz et al."s (2004) specification for the extremeness aversion heuristic. The modelling approach adopted here uses the contextual concavity specification of Equation (2.1), where the context dependence stems from the part-utilities of each attribute in the utility function being expressed as gains relative to the minimum part-utility of the same attribute in that choice set. For this dataset, Equation (4.1) expresses the utility for alternative j in each choice set: 
With the exception of the alternative specific constants, all other parameters are generic across alternatives. If the notion of diminishing returns to the gains in part utilities in the contextual concavity model is valid, the prior expectation is for k  to satisfy the inequality 01 k   . From the econometric perspective however, it is not necessary for such a constraint to be imposed on k  , hence we allow k  to be freely estimated. Moreover, written in the form above where the reference (i.e., "worst") attribute level, defined as the maximum of each of the time and cost components in the choice set, precedes the minus sign, the prior expectation is for ˆk  to be positive, in order for U j to be increasing in the gains in part utilities. Table 4 .2 reports the results of this non-linear logit estimation. Gourville and Soman (2007) requires all the power parameters to be greater than one. When extremeness aversion is exhibited only in a subset of attributes and not in all attributes of the alternatives, it may be concluded that respondents in this choice context are exhibiting the polarisation effect.
To summarise, the estimation results from Model 2 show that accounting for some form of referencing and accounting for non-linearity in the utility function are important. We leave open for future work the question of whether extremeness aversion and extremeness seeking are pervasive in other contexts, but in view of the evidence that we have, instead of what has hitherto been known as a contextual concavity model, which makes the prior assumption that utility is concave in the gains, it may be more useful to label such a functional specification as a "non-linear worst level referencing" (NLWLR) model. Whether the utility function is concave or convex in the gains might be best left as an empirical exercise.
Majority of Confirming Dimensions (MCD) Heuristic
Testing for the MCD heuristic involves, according to Hensher and Collins (2011) , generating a total count of the number of attributes in each alternative j that have the best levels across all alternatives in choice set s. This generated variable is labelled mcd. To contribute to the count, the attribute has to have an attribute level strictly better than all the levels of the same attribute in the other alternatives. Because of this requirement, when added up over all alternatives in the choice set, the levels of the mcd variable does not necessarily sum to five, which is the number of modelled attributes. Table 4 .3 illustrates the frequency distribution of the mcd variable in the dataset. An interesting question arises as to whether the generated mcd variable should enter into the utility expressions of all three alternatives, or only into the utility of just the hypothetical ones. Arguments can be made for either case. In the former, it may be assumed that the respondent chooses to consistently apply a particular heuristic across all alternatives in the choice set. Such a hypothesis would be in line with the choice goals framework described in Section 2.1, where it was mentioned that the choice environment itself influences the use of heuristics. In support of the latter hypothesis, we observe that in pivot designs, where the attribute levels of the current alternative are fixed throughout the experiment, even as the attribute levels of the hypothetical alternatives are varying from choice task to choice task, using a simplifying heuristic like MCD to assess the hypothetical alternatives would be cognitively easier on the respondent. At the same time, the cognitive burden of evaluating the current alternative using the weighted linear additive function in a fully compensatory sense is not very onerous: once the respondent calculates the value for the current alternative in the first choice set (or refers to a stored value in memory), it remains constant throughout.
On the basis of modelling fit, we observe that the mcd variable, modelled with a generic parameter across all three alternatives revealed a downward bias compared to modelling a generic mcd parameter for only the hypothetical alternatives, and an alternative specific mcd parameter for the current alternative, which turns out to be statistically insignificant at the five percent level. Estimation results testing both specifications are presented in Table 4 .4. Under the particular assumptions of the MNL model therefore, inclusion of the mcd variable was restricted to just the hypothetical alternatives. Results are shown in Table 4 .5. The inclusion of the MCD heuristic leads to a statistical improvement in the log-likelihood values of both the LPLA and NLWLR models. The estimated parameter of the mcd variable is positive and statistically significant, which concurs with the finding in Hensher and Collins (2011) . As Hensher and Collins (2011) analyse a different dataset (a proposed toll road in New Zealand), this result gives us an added measure of confidence about the robustness of the MCD heuristic across datasets. In terms of the parameter estimates, the key change from Model 2 to Model 4 lies in the power parameter for the SST variable. After accounting for the MCD heuristic, it can be seen that ˆS ST  is now statistically greater than one, suggesting convexity in the utility gains for SST and more generally, extremeness seeking in the time components.
The Reference Point Revision Heuristic
In the context of stated choice experiments, the reference point revision heuristic may be applied to the current choice task when a non status quo alternative was chosen previously (Hensher and Collins, 2011) . Essentially, this hypothesis states that the respondents" utility for an experimentally constructed alternative shifts (upwards) whenever a hypothetical alternative was chosen in the previous choice set. This version of reference revision may be distinguished from a broader concept of value learning. In the latter, underlying preferences in the form of the taste parameters may initially be poorly formed or unknown to the respondent and are discovered as respondents work through the sequence of choice tasks. For example, McNair et al. (2011a) show that preferences are sensitive to the sequence and attribute levels shown to respondents. In reference revision, the taste parameters are assumed to be stable but preferences can be affected by previous choices. Reference revision can also be interpreted from the perspective of the well documented status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) . Here, the respondent"s preceding choice works as a "local" status quo in exerting an influence on the current choice task. Econometrically, the specification used to model reference point revision is a more explicit and appropriate way of treating choice set interdependence, compared to using a correlated error variance structure (Hensher and Collins, 2011) .
Specifically, a dummy variable (refrev) was created that equals one whenever a hypothetical experimental alternative (i.e., Route A or Route B) was chosen in the previous choice set. This dummy variable was then inserted into the Route A/Route B utility functions of the current choice set. refrev was set to zero for the first choice set encountered by the respondent. As with the mcd variable, refrev was specified as entering the utility function in a linear additive manner. Results of this estimation are shown in Table 4 .6. Statistically, the LL values of Models 5 and 6 show a remarkable improvement over Models 3 and 4 when just one additional variable, refrev, is included, with the NLWLR model fitting the data better than LPLA. The refrev parameter is found to be positive and statistically significant, which again replicates the conclusion in Hensher and Collins (2011) . With these results, we are now beginning to amass a greater wealth of evidence that the reference revision heuristic and the MCD heuristic are important elements of decision making that should be explicitly included in future choice models.
Heuristic Weighting Functions
If it is believed that there is heterogeneity in decision processes, i.e., different respondents using different heuristics, one popular approach is to appeal to probabilistic decision process models (which are essentially latent class models) where the functional form of the heuristic under consideration is expressed through the utility expressions in each class Collins, 2011, McNair et al., 2011b; Hess et al., 2011) . Typically, each class represents one heuristic, which means that each respondent is assumed to be relying only on one heuristic. However, what that heuristic (i.e., class membership) might be for each individual can only be known up to a probability.
A suggested alternative to the latent class model approach is to weight each heuristic directly in the utility function. Within the utility function, this approach allocates the proportional contribution of each heuristic to overall utility, with the possibility of linking this share outcome to the characteristics of respondents and other possible contextual influences. This relaxes the assumption used thus far of supposing an equal contribution of each heuristic to the utility function. In a model with a total of M heuristics, the weights of each heuristic, denoted by W m , m=1,2,…,M can be given by means of a logistic function shown in Equation (4.2):
In Equation (4.2), Z l denotes the value of variable l which is typically a socio-economic variable or a variable describing context characteristics. lm  is a parameter weight that is allowed to vary according to each of the l variables and each of the m heuristics. To ensure identification of the model, it will be necessary to normalise, for every variable l, one lm  .
As an illustration of this approach, we explore a "mixture" of the LPLA standard fully compensatory decision rule and the NLWLR heuristic. This example is very much in the spirit of Tversky and Simonson"s (1993) componential contextual model, where utility comprises a context independent effect (in this case LPLA) and a context dependent effect (in this case NLWLR).
For this model, define the LPLA and NLWLR specifications as illustrated in Equation (4.3):
Consequently, the utility functions for each of the three alternatives in the choice set can be written in the form of Equation (4.4):  are assumed homogenous in the sample, the heuristic weights W 1 and W 2 will still differ across respondents following the variations in the socioeconomic characteristics including the interaction of income with cost. In particular, the income*cost interaction allows the weights to vary across the hypothetical alternatives of different choice sets even if they were answered by the same respondent. In effect, this interaction allows another avenue for the choice context to determine preferences. Table 4 .7 reports the results of the estimation for a fixed parameters model. Parameters which were not statistically significant at the five percent level were not estimated in the final model. Model 7, which combines the LPLA and NLWLR rules, shows a substantial improvement in fit compared to either Model 1 or Model 2, which tests each decision rule singly. From the results of Model 7, it appears as if respondents are selectively evaluating the SDT attribute only along the NLWLR heuristic, while the TC attribute appears only in the LPLA heuristic, suggesting that the heuristic weights W 1 and W 2 do not apply equally to all attributes. More specifically, this finding raises the interesting possibility that while the overall utility function is fully compensatory, individual heuristics may only be semicompensatory. Turning to the heuristic weights, the partial derivatives of W m with respect to each of its l arguments are functions that take the same sign as lm  . Hence, the estimation results show that W 1 , which is the weight of the LPLA heuristic, is increasing in age and decreasing in income*cost, with the opposite effect happening for W 2 , which represents the NLWLR heuristic. These are interesting findings as they demonstrate a relationship between the use of a heuristic and the socio economic characteristics of a respondent, and also with the choice context/choice set itself.
The distribution of W 1 and W 2 provides an indication of the strength of the context independent LPLA effect against the reference dependent NLWLR heuristic. We proceed to use the estimated parameter estimates to construct W 1 and W 2 , with Figure 4 .1 illustrating the kernel density plots of W 1 and W 2 . The means (standard deviation) of W 1 and W 2 are 0.538 (0.077) and 0.462 (0.077) respectively. Under this particular two-heuristic model, the (semi-compensatory) LPLA heuristic is found to take on a somewhat greater prominence in decision making compared to the NLWLR rule. 
Empirical Analysis: Multiple Heuristics in an Error Components Logit Model
Inclusion of the reference revision heuristic into the utility expressions for the hypothetical alternatives introduces a dummy variable indicating the type of alternative (current or hypothetical) chosen in the previous choice scenario. This reference revision variable is linked to the unobserved effects of the previous choice set and potentially induces endogeneity and correlation across choice sets for specific alternatives. Error components logit models are next estimated to address the issue. At the same time, these models are allowed to account for the panel nature of the data. The error components model is written in Equation (4.6). 
Two specifications are tested: one embedding refrev only and the other embedding both refrev and mcd. Results of the estimation are shown in Table 4 .8. In Models 8 and 9, the parameter on the reference revision heuristic is estimated at a lower value of around 0.4, compared to a value of around 2.2 in the MNL estimation of Model 5. This is a reduction of a factor of about five, with the t-ratio lowered by a factor of about six. This might be expected as some of the choice set interdependence embodied in reference revision is now picked up by the correlated error structure, so the reference revision effect identified earlier in Model 5 is due in some part to what was then un-modelled similarity in preferences. However, there is still a significant effect to refrev even after accounting for the panel nature of the data and for a possible correlation in error structure. Additionally, Model 9 shows that the MCD heuristic remains significant in a panel error components logit model embedding both the reference revision and MCD heuristics. Interestingly, the error component parameter θ ab in the hypothetical alternatives turned insignificant on the addition of the MCD variable to the utility expressions, indicating that the error component may itself be largely explained by the MCD heuristic. As suggestive as these findings are, there is certainly more to be done in understanding how the significance of reference revision as a heuristic is impacted with alternative specifications of the error component logit model.
Calculations of Value of Travel Time Savings (VTTS)
The marginal willingness-to-pay measure is a typical parameter of interest derived from choice models. This section explores some of the implications on VTTS of embedding the previously identified heuristics into the model.
As there are several time and cost components modelled, the denominator of the VTTS expression will be some weighted average of The summary results of the VTTS calculations for the various models are reported in Table  4 .9. The standard deviation values in the LPLA models are obtained as a result of applying different weights to the k  parameters. The range of the estimated VTTS is in the range of A$10 to A$18 per person-hour. From this dataset, there does not seem to be any discernible trend as to how VTTS estimates behave when heuristics are accounted for explicitly in the model. Models including the NLWLR heuristic tended to produce lower VTTS estimates, while the error components logit model including refrev and mcd, which is the best model from the statistical perspective, produces the highest VTTS value. 
Conclusion
One of the objectives of this paper is to review the heuristics that have been identified in the various disciplines and test the applicability of some of these heuristics to a dataset in the transport context. From this one dataset alone, we have found that referencing and nonlinearity appear to be important factors in understanding how choices are made. Where referencing is concerned, the analyst may wish to appeal to reference points within choice sets (as in the case of worst level referencing) and across choice sets (reference revision). Likewise, a non-linear specification of the utility function -be it extremeness aversion or extremeness seeking -seems to better capture preferences compared to a linear specification. Another simplifying heuristic -the majority of confirming dimensions -was also found to be a significant explanatory variable in the utility functions for the hypothetical alternatives. Using a logit-type heuristic weighting function that estimates the contribution of each heuristic to utility is also suggested as an alternative approach to latent class models, with some promising results. The choice experiments in the dataset were not specifically designed to test any of these heuristics and the empirical conclusions that have been reached might suggest that these heuristics are robust and may be quite appropriate descriptions of respondent behaviour. Additionally, we are getting some indications that the same heuristics are present in similar decision contexts involving toll roads. However, it seems that the door is still left open for future research to more thoroughly examine the question of portability, i.e., whether the kinds of heuristics examined herein are robust across datasets. Models may even be estimated on pooled data where it is feasible to do so.
The literature has observed that model outputs such as welfare estimates and willingness to pay can be substantially different when the model departs from the standard assumptions about decision making. However, the jury is still out on the direction of change to willingness to pay measures when heuristics are embedded into choice models. Some papers suggest an increase in the value of VTTS when heuristics are modelled (e.g., Hensher, 2010) , while others come to the opposite conclusion (e.g., Cantillo and Ortuzar, 2005) . Another fruitful area of further research is to attempt to uncover any systematic explanations for how the VTTS is impacted when heuristics are embedded into the model.
